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Abstract – GAMEFISTO simulation model is presented as a tool to improve the small scale fisheries bioeconomic
simulation techniques. The main novelty of the current model is the implementation of game theoretic techniques for
forecasting the fishing eﬀort trends and consequently, the fish population levels and the economic outcome, includ-
ing landings, income and net profits. The model assigns individual fishing strategies to individual vessels according
to their technical characteristics. The fishermen within a fishing fleet exploiting a single stock are assumed to be the
decision agents, who share not only a fish population (modelled through stock externality) but also a market, through an
oﬀer-demand function (market externality). Mediterranean fisheries need to be analysed at vessel level due to the het-
erogeneity of its fishing fleets. A ten year simulation on red shrimp, Aristeus antennatus, is presented as an application
of the presented GAMEFISTO model.
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Résumé – Un nouvel outil de simulation bioéconomique pour les pêches artisanales, basé sur la théorie des
jeux : le modèle GAMEFISTO. Le modèle de simulation GAMEFISTO est présenté comme un outil pour améliorer
les techniques de simulation bioéconomique des pêches artisanales. La nouveauté principale, par rapport au modèle
courant, est l’insertion de techniques de la théorie des jeux pour prévoir les tendances de l’eﬀort de pêche et par
conséquent, les niveaux de populations de poissons et les coûts économiques, y compris les débarquements, les revenus
et les profits nets. Le modèle attribue des stratégies individuelles de pêche à des navires en particulier selon leurs
caractéristiques techniques. Les pêcheurs d’une flottille de pêche exploitant un seul stock sont considérés comme les
agents de décision qui partagent non seulement une population de poissons (modélisée au niveau de l’externalité de
stock) mais aussi un marché, au travers d’une fonction, celle de l’oﬀre et de la demande (externalité de marché). Les
pêches méditerranéennes ont besoin d’être analysées au niveau du navire de pêche dû à l’hétérogénéité de ses flottilles.
Une simulation sur dix ans de la crevette rouge, Aristeus antennatus, est présentée en tant qu’application du modèle
GAMEFISTO.
1 Introduction
Fishing activity can be considered as an economic activ-
ity relying on a natural living resource. Bioeconomic mod-
els attempt to establish functional relationships between the
exploited natural resources and the economy they generate
(Merino 2006).
Bioeconomic simulation techniques have recently been de-
veloped to simulate the whole process of stock dynamics, fish-
ing activity, fishery assessment and management as an adap-
tive process (Grant et al. 1981; Isakson et al. 1982; Sparre and
Willman 1993; Mardle and Pascoe 2002; Ulrich et al. 2001,
2002; Lleonart et al. 2003).
Bioeconomic models must be useful to (Sparre and
Willman 1993) (i) explain quantitatively the observed
a Corresponding author: gmerino@icm.csic.es
bioeconomic patterns of a fishery, (ii) to identify and select
policy measures to achieve social and economic objectives and
(iii) determine the optimum application of the selected mea-
sures.
Game Theory is a formal tool to analyse strategic inter-
actions among a finite number of agents involved in a fish-
ery (Sumaila 1997; Sumaila 1999). Strategic interactions in
fisheries are interpreted as how the harvest by one agent
highly aﬀects the fishing strategy of the other agents (Grønbæk
2000). Game theoretic models have been widely used in fish-
eries bioeconomics, such as equilibrium global models with
symmetrical agents (Hannesson 1997), dynamic age struc-
tured models applied to fleet conflicts (Sumaila 1997), coun-
tries sharing migratory species (Arnason et al. 2001), inter-
national policy making (Munro 2006), fishing rights conflicts
(Levhari and Mirman 1980), high sea fisheries (Kaitala and
Lindroos 1998), or investigating benefits of cooperation and
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non cooperation in shared fisheries management (Hannesson
1995). Most of these cases are related to theoretical exercises
to describe the eﬀects of sharing a fishery. The main diﬀerence
of the GAMEFISTO model is that Game Theory is used to
model quantitatively an observed behaviour in Mediterranean-
type fisheries.
The simulation model presented here assumes that the key
factor to understand the evolution of the bioeconomic patterns
of a fishery is the evolution of the fishing mortality. The fishing
mortality applied to a population will determine its abundance,
its landings and the selling price and consequently the income
it generates and the costs needed to exploit it. It is known that
fishing mortality is composed of two concepts. The first is re-
lated to the eﬃciency to catch a target species, catchability,
and the other is related to the intensity in the use of such ef-
ficiency, the fishing eﬀort. The fishing eﬀort is applied by a
finite number of exploiters and the model simulates their fish-
ing intensity through a Game Theoretic algorithm. Once the
fishing strategy or behaviour of each exploiter (fisher) is cal-
culated, the total mortality applied to the exploited species is
calculated.
The approach was first proposed to explain an observed
behaviour in a red shrimp fishery (Merino 2006; Merino et al.
2007) and it makes the simulation tool valid to test alternative
management strategies (AMS) other than fishing eﬀort reduc-
tions to achieve equivalent reduction of fishing mortality to
keep stocks at healthy (profitable) conditions.
The model oﬀers a new perspective on the behaviour of
fishermen, considering its rationality and also oﬀers a perspec-
tive on the long and short term uses of a fishery.
2 Material and methods
The bioeconomic simulation model presented (GAMEs in
MEditerranean FIsheries Simulation TOols) (Merino 2006) in-
troduces an eﬀort dynamics submodel based on game theory
to reproduce fishermen’s behaviour as its main novelty. The
exploited resource is described with classical biomass surplus
models and the economic submodel is based on a simple bal-
ance between gross revenues and the costs derived from the
fishing activity.
The simulation is structured in three well diﬀerentiated
frames: the resource box, the economic submodel and the de-
cision box.
The interaction between the exploited populations and the
economic outcome they generate is the main characteristic
of the bioeconomic simulation models (Isakson et al. 1982;
Sparre and Willman 1993; Lleonart et al. 1999; Ulrich et al.
1999; Lleonart et al. 2003) and it is modelled by means of
the fishing mortality term. Fishing mortality is dependent on
a catchability term and on fishing eﬀort and described in our
model as an endogenous variable.
The decision submodel simulates the eﬀort strategy
adopted by a single fisherman with a game theoretic approach.
The average catchability coeﬃcient is introduced as a pa-
rameter in the simulation and recalculated for each vessel by
means of individual catch per unit of eﬀort data (Merino 2006;
Merino et al. 2007).
2.1 The resource box
The model considers the resource as a pool of marine
species that can be commercialized. Those species consid-
ered by the user as target species are formulated as renew-
able resources, i.e., an explicit population dynamics model de-
termines its abundance in the exploited system, following a
biomass surplus production model (Schaefer 1954; Schaefer
1957) (Eq. (1)) and Pella’s solution concept (Pella 1967)
(Eq. (2)):
dB
dt = rB
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K
)
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K
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)
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(1)
Biomass dynamics of a target population (B) is described by
an intrinsic growth parameter (r), a carrying capacity term (K)
and landings as a rate (L). Note that landings are described
by available biomass (B) and fishing mortality (F). The last is
composed of an average catchability (q) coeﬃcient and total
fishing eﬀort (E).
The solution for time t+δ, where αt = r−Ft and β = rK−1
is the following:
Bt+δ =
αtBteαtδ
αt + βBt(eαtδ − 1) . (2)
The catches of the selected species s of a v vessel from the
Nvessel fleet are:
Ls,v,t =
t+δ∫
t
Fs,v,tBs,tdt =
Fs,v,t
βs
Ln
[
1 − βsBs,t(1 − e
αs,tδ)
αs,t
]
. (3)
The fishing mortality applied by a single fisherman to a tar-
get species (F) is formulated combining a catchability coeﬃ-
cient (q) and a fishing eﬀort level (E).
Fv,t = qv,tEv,t. (4)
Catchability coeﬃcient is dynamic, evolves in time with a con-
stant annual increase ϕ (Lleonart et al. 2003; Merino 2006;
Merino et al. 2007). The increase in catchability coeﬃcient
simulates a constant increase in vessels’ technology and fish-
ing power. Note that increase in technology has no finite limit
as time tends to infinite. In contrast, imposing limits to vessels’
technical improvements would imply parameterization prob-
lems to allocate current technology in relation to a maximum
(reachable only when t → ∞). The simulations’ time horizon
is recommended not to exceed 15–20 years for realistic results.
The use of a constant increase catchability model tends to ap-
proach the observed increase in technology at short and mid
term.
qv,t = qv,t0(1 + ϕ)t. (5)
The secondary species are those present in the fishing gears
mixed with the target species and are also accounted for by the
model. Neither their population dynamics nor the ecological
interactions between species are explicitly modelled, but their
landings (LS) are related to the landings of target species of
each vessel through a linear relation (Eq. (6)):
LS s,v,t = μs + υs · Ls,v,t. (6)
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The parameters μ and υ are empirically estimated for each tar-
get species and are respectively, the catch of secondary species
in absence of target species and the catch unit of secondary for
each target species catch unit.
2.2 The economic submodel
The economic submodel describes the transformation of
landings into net profits by each fisherman. The target species’
landings become revenues through product price (p) dynamics
depending on the oﬀer (total landings). Note that total landings
are the sum of the landings of each fisherman v of the Nvessel
fleet:
ps,t
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
N∑
v=1
Ls,v,t
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ = λs
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
N∑
v=1
Ls,v,t
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
ωs
. (7)
λ is the price if only one unit of product was landed by the
whole fleet. ω is the price flexibility, which describes the mod-
ification of the price when modifying the oﬀer. Note that price
will decrease when landings are more abundant and conse-
quently, ω < 0.
The gross revenues for each vessel including income from
S target species and related secondary species (secondary
species price, ps) is the following:
Rv,t =
S∑
s=1
(ps,t · Ls,v,t + pss · LS s,v,t). (8)
The economic balance is computed substracting the total costs
of each vessel from the revenues. The costs that GAMEFISTO
accounts for are divided in four groups (based partially on
Lleonart et al. 1999):
• Trade cost (C1). It includes fishermen association taxes and
sale process or commercialization taxes. It is expressed as a
percentage of the total revenues and this percentage is consid-
ered to be the same for the whole fleet (c1).
C1v,t = c1 · Rv,t/100. (9)
• Daily cost (C2). It includes fuel costs, net mending, daily
food expenses, ice and other daily costs excluding labour costs.
It is expressed as a function of fishing eﬀort and reflects the
fleets’ heterogeneity.
C2v,t = c2vEv,t. (10)
• Labour cost (C3). The share (c3) corresponding to the crew
in function of the money remaining after deducting the com-
mon trade and daily costs (MM). The share is considered to be
the same for every vessel in a fleet.
MMv,t = Rv,t −C1v,t −C2v,t (11)
C3v,t = c3 · MMv,t. (12)
• Compulsory cost (C4). Harbour costs, license, insurance and
yearly costs supposed to be constant and expressed at vessel
level.
2.3 The decision box
The output of the economic submodel is the net profits at
vessel level (πv).
πv,t = Rv,t −C1v,t −C2v,t −C3v,t −C4v,t. (13)
In the model, fishers determine their eﬀort strategy based on
their expected discounted profits over time. The net present
value of profits of each vessel (NPVv) assuming a non-zero
discount rate (δ) is given by:
NPVv =
τ∫
t=t0
e−δtπv,t. (14)
For the main working hypothesis in the present document, fish-
ermen are proposed to be a finite number of non cooperative
players sharing a common resource and market. In a finite time
interval, each fisherman will strive to maximize its discounted
profits knowing that the fish that is caught by the others will
not be available to him (stock externality) (Oakerson 1992;
Mesterton-Gibbons 1993; Grønbæk 2000) and that the sell-
ing price of his product will be a result of the total production
(market externality).
This working hypothesis has been demonstrated in previ-
ous works (Merino 2006; Merino et al. 2007) to be a realistic
approach to Mediterranean fisheries. It is used in the present
document as a tool to forecast the individual eﬀort strategies
(number of fishing days) and as a consequence the fishing mor-
tality applied to the exploited stocks.
The vessels heterogeneity is expressed through the individ-
ual catchability coeﬃcients (qv) and the individual daily (C2v)
and compulsory (C4v) costs. The individual eﬀort strategies
will result from this heterogeneity. The fishery is modelled as
a finite renewable resource shared by the N asymmetric ves-
sels within a fleet, hence the model considers the fishing sys-
tem as an N-asymmetrical players game sharing a dynamic
(multispecies) resource with a dynamic market. Its solution is
considered next.
The solution concept searched in the decision box is
Nash’s solution for non cooperative games (Nash 1951; Luce
and Raiﬀa 1989; Fudenberg and Tirole 1991; Mesterton-
Gibbons 1993; Merino 2006; Merino et al. 2007). The solution
is proposed as a realistic approach to fishermen’s behaviour
that will direct the evolution of the whole fishery through the
fishing mortality as a key factor. The solution to the individ-
ual eﬀort strategies jointly with the individual catchability pa-
rameters will determine the fishing mortality on the targeted
species and consequently its population dynamics, production
and the economic outcome of its exploitation.
The eﬀort strategies solution searched (E∗1, ...E∗i , ...E∗N)
must satisfy the following condition:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
NPV1(E∗1, ...E∗v , ...E∗N)  NPV1(E1, ...E∗v , ...E∗N)
....................................................................
NPVv(E∗1, ...E∗v , ...E∗N)  NPVv(E∗1, ...Ev, ...E∗N)
...................................................................
NPVN(E∗1, ...E∗v , ...E∗N)  NPVN(E∗1, ...E∗v , ...EN)
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
(15)
with the condition that 0  Ei  Emax.
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Equation (15) is nothing but a non-cooperative scheme for
an N-players game sharing a resource and its market. The
system is solved with a successive approximation method to
iteratively approximate solutions for the N equilibrium equa-
tions. In other words, fishermen “play the game”. Each fisher-
man evaluates its outcome with the eﬀort strategies within 0
and Emax. Only integer values were considered and the equi-
libria converged to the same Nash solution when fishermen to
play first were alternated. Fishermen evaluated all the eﬀort
strategies and choose the one which results in the highest NPV
value. Later on, the other fishermen decide theirs and as other
players’ eﬀort changes, the first player re-evaluates its strate-
gies and re-decides the most profitable. The iterations were
alternatively run (each fisherman’s decision) until Nash equi-
librium was reached, i.e. an equilibrium where no player has a
unilateral incentive to depart. The numeric results were unique
for the case study and the robustness of the solution was vali-
dated (Merino 2006).
The eﬀort strategy is constant during the simulation
time, i.e. the game is quasi-static (Mesterton-Gibbons 1993;
Sumaila 1998) and it characterizes agents as intensive, mid-
intensity and occasional fishermen. In contrast, an uncertainty
parameter (below) to each time eﬀort decision will simulate
deviations from the chosen strategy due to climate conditions
or other non-economic factors.
2.4 Time scale, initial conditions and uncertainty
The bioeconomic loop is completed in a year time step af-
ter selecting a single eﬀort strategy, constant in time, for each
fisherman. The output variables, both biological and economic
are displayed at a yearly scale. The model input is related to
population and diﬀerent level economic characteristics.
The stochastic simulation seeks to analyze the eﬀects of
uncertainty of one or several parameters (Lleonart et al. 1999;
Lleonart et al. 2003; Merino 2006). The GAMEFISTO model
assumes uncertainty on two processes, population dynamics
and decision making.
The uncertainty on the surplus production models has
widely been studied (Polacheck et al. 1993; Haddon 2001).
The uncertainty observed on biomass models parameter esti-
mation is focused on two aspects: a process error related to the
population model and an observation error derived from the
uncertainty of the available data that most of the times repre-
sents the main source of error in fishery science (Hilborn and
Walters 1992). The process error is considered with a lognor-
mal error structure at the moment of calculating catches, while
the observation uncertainty is tackled with a normal distribu-
tion of observed error in the same catch equation (Eq. (16)).
The parameter m1 is the median slope relating estimated to ob-
served catch, and n1, is the standard deviation of the slopes.
The observation error is considered additive and normally dis-
tributed, with a mean error (ξ1) and a standard deviation (σ1).
A random normal distributed value is added to the calculated
value. The uncertainty parameters should be based on observa-
tions. In each iteration of the stochastic simulations, the deter-
ministic level of landings (Ls,v,t) was replaced by a stochastic
level of landings ( ˜Ls,v,t).
˜Ls,v,t = Ls,v,tε1 + η1 (16)
where ε1 ≈ LN(ln m1, ln n1) and η1 ≈ N(ξ1, σ1). Note that LN
is a log-normal distribution.
The uncertainty in the decision making simulates the non
controllable processes for the application of eﬀort, i.e., envi-
ronmental conditions that make impossible the activity or an-
other exogenous (non strictly economic) variable that is not
described by the model. Each value of temporal eﬀort at ves-
sel level is calculated assigning a lognormal multiplicative er-
ror and a normally distributed additive error (Eq. (17)). The
parameter m2 is the median slope relating estimated to ob-
served eﬀort, and n2 its standard deviation. The observation er-
ror again is considered additive and normally distributed, with
a mean error (ξ2) and a standard deviation (σ2). In each itera-
tion of the stochastic simulations, the deterministic eﬀort strat-
egy resulting from Eq. (15) (Ev) was replaced by a stochastic
level of landings ( ˜Ev,t). Note that the eﬀort strategies may not
remain exactly constant in time due to the stochastic term, re-
calculated each time step.
˜Ev,t = Ev · ε2 + η2 (17)
where ε2 ≈ LN(ln m2, ln n2) and η2 ≈ N(ξ2, σ2). Note that LN
is a log-normal distribution.
The simulation presented is performed attending to this un-
certainty with a pool of iterations that are aggregated in mean
and 5 and 95% quantile iterations.
2.5 Application to the red shrimp fishery
in Blanes (NW Mediterranean)
Located in northern Catalonia, on the north-western
Mediterranean, Blanes harbour was in 2004 the sixth port in
term of revenues in Catalonia (Spain). The main target species
of the local trawling fleet is the red shrimp, Aristeus anten-
natus (Risso 1816), representing almost 50% of its total in-
come, which is the most important resource for the trawling
fleets in the region (Sardá 2000; Sardá et al. 2003). Recent
studies on population dynamics and assessments of Spanish
Mediterranean stocks of A. antennatus showed that this species
is slightly overexploited (Carbonell et al. 1999; Carbonell et al.
2003; Sardá et al. 2003). The data series from 1997 to 2004 re-
port annual landings fluctuating from around the 60 tons from
1997 to 2002 with a significant decline from 2002 to 2004.
The bottom-trawl fleet of Blanes is composed of twelve
vessels that operate near the Blanes submarine canyon from
400 to 800 m depths (Demestre and Lleonart 1993; Demestre
and Martin 1993; Sardá 1993; Bas et al. 2003; Sardá et al.
2003) targeting red shrimp and a pool of secondary species.
Trawlers, as common in Mediterranean fisheries, are heteroge-
neous, both in their technical characteristics (catchability and
costs of fishing) and in their fishing behaviour (eﬀort applied
into a target species).
The accessory species caught jointly with the red shrimp
are: Norway lobster (Nephrops norvegicus), blue whiting (Mi-
cromesistius poutassou), hake (Merluccius merluccius), squid
(Loligo vulgaris), greater forkbeard (Phycis blennoides) and
angler (Lophius piscatorius), that represent almost 36% of the
total revenues of the trawling fleet. The need to account for
secondary species’ revenues is characteristic of Mediterranean
fisheries (Lleonart et al. 2003).
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Table 1. Parameters related to the target red shrimp (Merino 2006) and COCTEL (Sardá 2000).
Parameter Meaning Process Equation Value
r Intrinsic growth Population 1,2,3,4 0.96 year−1
dynamics
K Carrying capacity 1,2,3,4 327 700 kg
q2004 Average catchability 1,2,3,4 5.9 × 10−4 day−1
B2004 Initial biomass 1,2,3,4 47 846 kg
μ Secondary species per vessel Secondary species 5 24 732 kg
when no target is landed
υ Unit of secondary for target 5 2.96 kg kg target−1
unit landed
λ Price if only one unit was Price dynamics 6 2974 e kg−1
landed by the fleet
ω Flexibility 6 −0.42
ps Secondary species price 7 5.09 e kg−1
Table 2. Parameters related to trawlers of the Blanes fleet (Merino
2006) and COCTEL (Sardá 2000). Daily cost (c2v) includes fuel
costs, net mending, daily food expenses, ice and other daily costs.
Compulsory cost (C4v) includes harbour costs, license, insurance and
yearly costs supposed to be constant.
Vessel Catchability Daily cost Compulsory cost
(qv,10−4 day−1) (c2v, e day−1) (C4v, e year−1)
v-1 1.2 358.5 51 860
v-2 6.8 960.5 75 080
v-3 6.3 636.2 66 815
v-4 8.3 653.8 75 080
v-5 2.9 551.3 50 335
v-6 9.1 868.0 69 487
v-7 5.4 950.0 75 080
v-8 7.2 469.0 50 900
v-9 2.5 195.5 67 571
v-10 9.4 950.0 51 137
v-11 2.9 486.6 64 719
v-12 8.8 736.6 75 080
Trawlers operate with crews of four or five people, in ad-
dition to the owner who usually is also the skipper and who
makes any decision in terms of fishing strategies. The eﬀort
decisions are represented as days at the sea, which has been re-
ported an adequate unit for Mediterranean fisheries (Lleonart
et al. 1999; Lleonart and Maynou 2003; Lleonart et al. 2003;
Merino 2006; Merino et al. 2007).
Parameters related to the target species (red shrimp) are
shown in Table 1.
Parameters related to vessels characteristics are shown in
Table 2.
There are some parameters that are the same for the entire
fleet, such as the trade costs, share to the owner, discount rate,
the annual increase in catchability and the limit to their activity
(Table 3).
Uncertainty was introduced in the simulation model with
Eqs. (16) and (17) and their parameters are shown in Table 4.
Table 3. Parameters related to trawlers of the Blanes fleet, (Merino
2006) and COCTEL (Sardá 2000). Trade cost (c1) includes fishermen
association taxes and sale process or commercialization taxes. Share
(c3) is the corresponding percentage to the crew in function of the
money remaining after deducting the common trade and daily cost.
Trade cost 7%
(c1, % Total Income)
Share (c3 % MM) 50%
Discount rate (δ) 0.04 (4%)
Annual increase in catchability 3%
Limit to eﬀort 240 days
(maximum days at sea)
Table 4. Uncertainty parameters into catch and eﬀort equations
(Merino 2006).
Catch Eq. (16)
m1 n1 ξ1 σ1
1.031 1 −605.6 6209.2
Eﬀort Eq. (17)
m2 n2 ξ2 σ2
0.662 1 15.2 35.1
3 Results
The first result obtained by the GAMEFISTO simulation
model is the vessel-level eﬀort strategy that will determine the
fishing mortality applied to the target population from 2004
to 2013 and the evolution of the economic indicators of each
vessel (Table 5).
As it is easily observed, a group of vessels (v-1, v-2, v-5,
v-7 and v-11) is calculated to leave the activity, another group
(v-3, v-6, v-10 and v-12) is calculated to fish with mid inten-
sity and three vessels (v-4, v-8 and v-9) will be estimated to
fish more intensely, near the day limit imposed by the admin-
istrations.
It is important to note that the GAMEFISTO model does
not consider negative eﬀort strategies and when the uncertainty
introduced in the eﬀort equation (Eq. (17)) leads to a negative
value it will be recalculated. As a consequence of this and of
the positive parameters ξ2 and σ2 the simulation will assign
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Fig. 1. Projections of the bioeconomic indicators of the Blanes red shrimp (Aristeus antennatus) fishery in Blanes (NW Mediterranean) with
the GAMEFISTO model.
Table 5. Forecasted individual vessel’s eﬀort strategies.
Vessel Eﬀort Expected
(days at discounted profits
sea) (103 e)
v-1 0 −10.02
v-2 0 −44.55
v-3 155 243.72
v-4 196 452.81
v-5 0 34.32
v-6 124 332.30
v-7 0 −139.83
v-8 240 779.14
v-9 240 65.51
v-10 103 496.83
v-11 0 −55.19
v-12 168 437.66
Total 1226 2592.9
positive low values of eﬀort to vessels initially estimated to
leave the red shrimp fishery. The initial total eﬀort of 1226 will
be increased in the simulation assigning low values to vessels
initially estimated not to fish.
To sum up, the model classifies fishermen in low, mid and
high eﬀort intensity groups attending to their technical charac-
teristics to exploit the studied target species.
The resulting fishing mortality, which is a sum of the prod-
uct between each fishermen eﬀort strategy and their respective
catchability coeﬃcients will determine the population abun-
dance, the landings and net profits (Fig. 1).
Displayed projections indicate that population will be sus-
tained at around 45–50 tons, representing 14–15% of its carry-
ing capacity, which means a significant overexploitation level.
Landings are estimated to fluctuate around 40 tons, which rep-
resent a considerable reduction from the preceding decade,
where they did around 60 tons. The observed high fishing mor-
tality observed during 2004 (Merino 2006) is estimated to be
slightly reduced . The profitability of the exploitation is sim-
ulated to be stabilized at around 0.4 Me and seems to be de-
clining on the long run.
GAMEFISTO model allows an economic analysis at ves-
sel level but it was assumed as non relevant for the present
document.
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4 Discussion
The results obtained for the case study must be analyzed
considering some characteristics of Mediterranean fisheries.
First is misreporting: there are indications that allow to assure
that fishermen revenues are underestimated and probably costs
overestimated (Merino 2006). As a consequence, vessels sup-
posed to be obtaining negative benefits that should lead them
to leave the activity are obtaining higher landings than the re-
ported in the data series used for parameter estimation. The
uncertainty algorithm in the eﬀort equation (Eq. (17)) allows
the correction of this phenomenon assigning low eﬀort with a
non-null probability to those vessels estimated to apply a null
eﬀort. On the other hand, fishermen may choose between two
or three fishing grounds and may decideto apply no eﬀort to
red shrimp. Red shrimp is the most valuable target species but
also the one caught in the farther grounds and the fishery that
brings higher costs. As a consequence, vessels deciding not to
apply an eﬀort unit to red shrimp, will apply it to another target
species. The model describes only the behaviour related to the
red shrimp exploitation.
The projections of the bioeconomic indicators suggest that
analyzing the red shrimp fishery as a shared resource, makes it
possible to assure that the stock will not be overexploited to ex-
tinction, despite being heavily overfished. The model estimates
a slight decrease in the fishing eﬀort observed in 2003 and
2004 bringing a slight reduction of the mortality applied into
the red shrimp population and total profits fluctuating around
the 0.2 and 0.6 Me with the mean trajectory stable at 0.4.
The GAMEFISTO simulation seeks to approach to an
observed reality of the bioeconomic indicators of a fishery
through the fishing behaviour of the vessels operating it. It may
be stated that a macro-observation is analyzed attending to a
pool of micro-realities (Finlayson 1994). The response of fish-
ermen at the time of decision making to a management scheme
will determine the evolution of the exploited populations and
the economic outcome of the activity.
The model analyzes these responses through Game The-
oretic analysis, which represent its main novelty. It was ini-
tially conceived for Mediterranean fisheries and it is adequate
to fisheries where vessel level analysis is needed and where
boats present a significant technical heterogeneity, which is the
case of many small-scale coastal fisheries. Based on that het-
erogeneity the model estimates some observed behaviour of
choosing a fishing ground or staying at the port due to bioeco-
nomic variables such as declines in the exploited populations’
abundance, increase in fishing costs derived from changes in
fuel price or other economic events. It also responds to the
need to account for income from multispecific landings, very
common in Mediterranean and tropical fisheries.
The model is based on the “shared resource” concept
(Hardin 1968) and is formulated through two concepts such
as “stock and market externalities” (Mesterton-Gibbons 1993;
Grønbæk 2000) that relate individual behaviour to other fish-
ermen strategies. Mathematically, equations are solved with
Nash’s solution concept for non cooperative players (Nash
1951; Mesterton-Gibbons 1993).
The model allows also to understand fishermen behaviour,
which is leading many of the world’s stocks into overfish-
ing or collapse (Pauly et al. 2002; FAO 2004) as rational
(Camerer and Fehr 2006). Understanding the processes that
direct the evolution of a system is highly necessary to estimate
its future.
Moreover, the model allows to analyze the eﬀects of some
bioeconomic management actions such as removing subsidies,
motivating the dismissal of boats, reducing the limits to eﬀort,
controlling the price formation of the selling product or the
technical investments into the fishing units.
The GAMEFISTO model is also provided with two opti-
mization algorithms. The first, it is constrained with a homoge-
nous eﬀort solution that maximizes the expected discounted
profits imposing a homogeneous fishing behaviour, and the
second, it chooses the vessels that will apply the eﬀort lead-
ing the fishery near to the maximum economic yield.
GAMEFISTO departs from other multi-species bioeco-
nomic simulation models (Placenti et al. 1995; Babcock and
Pikitch 2000; Sparre 2001; Ulrich et al. 2002; Griﬃn 2003;
Lleonart et al. 2003), essentially on its Game Theoretic algo-
rithm. For Mediterranean fisheries, the only bioeconomic mod-
els available until now were the MEFISTO and MOSES sim-
ulation models, the first based on age structured populations
and a decision box based on empirical rules and the second,
based on equilibrium populations and eﬀort allocation. The un-
certainty included in the catch and eﬀort equations represents
another improvement that was already present in MEFISTO
simulation model for Mediterranean fisheries (Lleonart et al.
2003).
Acknowledgements. Thanks to two anonymous referees for their con-
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